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THE EVOLUTION OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM 






In evaluating the implications of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009 (WSARA), we compare the position of prior acquisition acts and DoD 
acquisition policies to this new act. We examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of WSARA as it relates to major defense acquisition programs 
and acquisition programs in general. The rationale for changes to the policy is 
examined, and conclusions are drawn regarding the impact of this new policy on 
DoD acquisition programs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: WEAPON SYSTEM 
ACQUISITION BEFORE THE WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION 
REFORM ACT OF 2009 
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) enacted 
seven specific areas of change to previous acquisition policy. These are 
identified in WSARA Sections 201–207. The seven areas of focus are presented 
below with a summary of how they were addressed in previous policy, and 
difficulties encountered by the Department of Defense (DoD) during Major 
Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) execution. Chapters II–VIII then compare 
past policy to direction provided in WSARA, identify advantages and 
disadvantages, and summarize recommendations and conclusions regarding 
implementation of WSARA. 
A. CONSIDERATION OF TRADE-OFFS AMONG COST, SCHEDULE, AND 
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES IN DOD ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
Prior to implementation of WSARA, tradeoff analyses to determine cost, 
schedule, or performance requirements were not explicitly required to be 
performed as early as an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Past guidance stated, 
“keep all reasonable options open and facilitate cost, schedule, and performance 
trades throughout the acquisition process,” (DoDI 5000.2, s. 4.7.2.1.1.1) and had 
a strong emphasis on trades performed throughout the technology development 
and engineering and manufacturing development phases. This allowed for 
system design and implementation to progress to a point whereby requirement 
adjustment could cause severe cost or schedule perturbations. Tradeoff analyses 
performed at the material solution analysis phase of the acquisition process can 
result in less substantial cost or schedule growth, as the overall program cost 
and schedule impact from requirements changes in later phases will be too great. 
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B. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES TO ENSURE COMPETITION 
THROUGHOUT THE LIFE CYCLE OF MDAPS 
Past acquisition policy has required that DoD establish formal acquisition 
strategies for MDAPs, however, the requirement to include provisions for 
competition throughout the life cycle has not been explicitly stated or detailed. 
Specific measures to ensure competition were not defined in past policy, and 
continued competition through the Operation and Sustainment (O&S) phases 
was regularly overlooked. While competition at the subcontract level was 
encouraged, past policy did not require that the government evaluate proposals 
based, in part, on the degree to which subcontract competition was utilized. 
Combined with a shrinking industrial base, this acquisition strategy environment 
has led to a DoD culture with a strong precedent for contracting officers to waive 
competition requirements based on the need to retain the services of current 
contractors. 
C. PROTOTYPING REQUIREMENTS FOR MDAPS 
Prior to implementation of WSARA, competitive prototyping was part of 
the early development planning from conception to Milestone A and used during 
the research & development (R&D) phase for assuring the best design was 
selected. Competitive prototyping was not a requirement or codified law, so 
implementation was at the exclusive discretion of the acquisition office. Without a 
formal requirement to assess and implement competitive prototyping, acquisition 
offices lacked a formal competitive path to translate user needs and opportunities 
into demonstrable solutions before Milestone B approval, contributing to cost and 
schedule overruns. 
D. ACTIONS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN 
MDAPS PRIOR TO MILESTONE B APPROVAL 
Past acquisition policy demonstrated an inadequate amount of oversight 
and review to assure problems with various programs did not reach out-of-control 
 3
cost and schedule overruns. Systemic problems were rarely identified before 
Milestone B approval; allowing these faults to be manifested beyond the 
technology development phase where they could be most easily addressed. 
Nunn-McCurdy critical cost growth breach reporting requirements were stringent, 
but still allowed for MDAP execution without adequate program review. 
E. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN MDAPS 
Acquisition processes established prior to WSARA allowed MDAPs to 
start with unproven technologies, allowing programs to proceed down an 
acquisition path with high risk to system development. These processes allowed 
systems to be developed without having the requirements clearly defined. 
Subsequent re-baselining efforts did not solve the program’s problem(s) root 
cause (immature technology); rather, the risk was moved to a later phase of the 
acquisition. 
F. CRITICAL COST GROWTH IN MDAPS 
Past acquisition policy and reforms perceived cost growth to be an 
indicator of a flaw in the design or development of the MDAP. Program Managers 
(PM) were able to re-baseline the program cost and schedule as long as there 
was technical progress being made, or the rationale for cost growth was 
reasonable. Minimal reporting was required and the thresholds for cost growth 
reporting were inadequately high, allowing substantial cost overrun to occur prior 
to alerting oversight activities. 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MDAPS 
Existing acquisition law was not adequate to protect MDAPs from the 
Conflict of Interest (COI) issues that arise when companies are the source and 
the supplier of information to the MDAPs. The potential for COI was particularly 
threatening in acquisition programs where industry was heavily involved in the 
development of acquisition strategy or program requirements. The policies in 
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place prior to WSARA did not provide details regarding the implementation of 
blocking potential conflicts. Without adequate regulation, the perception of COI, if 
not actual improprieties, was likely to impact the acquisition decisions made by 
MDAPs. 
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II. CONSIDERATION OF TRADE-OFFS AMONG COST, 
SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES IN DOD 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) explicitly 
requires that “the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that mechanisms are 
developed and implemented to require consideration of trade-offs among cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives as part of the process for developing 
requirements for Department of Defense acquisition programs” (WSARA s. 
201(a)). This direction is not a completely new requirement placed on DoD 
programs. Instead, the WSARA emphasizes an existing aspect of the acquisition 
process, and now uses this process as a prerequisite to the establishment of 
performance objectives. This shift to emphasizing tradeoffs earlier in the process 
is the latest in evolution of the trade-off requirement in acquisition policy. While 
the motivation for this change may be justified, obstacles remain to effective 
implementation of this requirement. 
The focus on performing cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs prior 
to establishment of performance objectives is driven by systemic cost and 
schedule overruns in DoD acquisition programs. As noted in a March 2009 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, “this approach must begin with 
strong systems engineering analysis that balances a weapon system’s 
requirements with available resources” (GAO 09-326, p. 8). The report makes 
clear the perception that under previous acquisition paradigms, performance 
objectives were established without consideration for cost and schedule impact. 
This is closely tied to DoD’s inability to perform accurate cost estimation, another 
issue brought forth by the GAO’s statement that “of DoD’s 96 active major 
defense acquisition programs, 64 programs have reported increases in their 
projected cost since their initial cost estimate” (GAO 09-326, p. 2). The goal of 
the WSARA legislation and subsequent changes to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 
5000.02 is to adequately balance cost, schedule, and performance risk during 
 6
the requirements definition phase of program acquisition. Armed with these 
tradeoff analyses from program inception, continued refinement of cost, 
schedule, and performance goals should have less severe impact as the 
program matures. DoD is instructed to establish mechanisms that allow 
programs to “develop estimates and raise cost and schedule matters before 
performance objectives are established for capabilities for which the Chairman of 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is the validation authority” (WSARA s. 
201(a)(2)(A)), and “including the deferral of technologies that are not yet mature 
and capabilities that are likely to increase costs significantly or delay production 
until later increments” (WSARA s. 201(a)(2)(B)). 
DoDI 5000.2, as updated in 2003, identified the need to establish trade 
space regarding performance and cost estimates. Regarding the definition of 
user requirements, that instruction directed that developers “address cost in the 
ORD, in terms of a threshold and objective” (DoDI 5000.2, s. 4.7.2.1.1.8). The 
difference between DoDI 5000.2 and a more recent policy found in WSARA and 
DoDI 5000.02 lies in the explicit direction that tradeoffs be performed during 
analysis of alternative efforts and the Material Solution Analysis phase. While 
past guidance stated, “keep all reasonable options open and facilitate cost, 
schedule, and performance trades throughout the acquisition process,” (DoDI 
5000.2, s. 4.7.2.1.1.1) and had a strong emphasis on trades performed 
throughout the Technology Development and Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development Phases, WSARA forces this cost-schedule-performance tradeoff 
process into the Material Solution Analysis phase. Following the approval of 
WSARA in May 2009, DoD issued further execution guidance to DoDI 5000.02 
through Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027–Implementation of the 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, dated December 4, 2009. This 
memorandum amended DoDI 5000.02 to direct “full consideration of possible 
trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives for each alternative 
considered” (DTM 09-027, 2009). 
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The successful establishment of the tradeoff mechanisms required by the 
WSARA, however, may prove to be a challenge. Beyond the WSARA language 
directing DoD to implement these tradeoffs, there is little to guide DoD in actual 
implementation. Vague wording in both the WSARA and DoDI 5000.02 
amendments leave the definition of how this tradeoff process should be 
accomplished unclear. The WSARA establishes a Director of Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (DCAPE). The DCAPE is to “lead in the development of 
study guidance for an analysis of alternatives for each joint military requirement 
for which the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is the 
validation authority,” and provide “full consideration of possible trade-offs among 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives for each alternative considered” 
(WSARA s. 201(d)). Observers have stated, “the new office creates a chain of 
command that operates in parallel to the undersecretary of defense for 
acquisition, so there is much confusion at the Pentagon as to how programs are 
supposed to be certified and approved” (Erwin, 2010). 
Additionally, it is questionable if cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives tradeoffs are reliably quantifiable prior to and during the analysis of 
alternative phase. These tradeoffs are to be conducted prior to any internal 
technology development; tradeoffs regarding technical capability estimates may 
be inherently unreliable. These assessments would be based almost purely on 
market research and previous development efforts. While this type of tradeoff 
and associated analyses are routinely performed by user study groups, 
conducting formal tradeoffs as selection criteria for performance objectives may 
unfairly skew performance objectives to values that are less than desirable. The 
WSARA gives no criteria by which cost, schedule, and performance should be 
assessed. This provides DoD, and presumably each acquisition office, the 
flexibility to determine suitability of requirements based on program specifics. 
However, this also means that the tradeoff rationale can assume a wide range of 
interpretation. Negotiation of performance objectives with the user organizations  
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and resource sponsors must be based on sound cost and schedules and may be 
better conducted upon completion of an analysis of alternatives and 
establishment of technology development plans. 
As demonstrated by GAO reports and the DoD’s acknowledgement of 
routine cost and schedule overruns, Congress has expressed a justifiable 
demand for increased rigor in cost and schedule tradeoff analyses prior to 
establishing Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) performance 
objectives. WSARA explicitly requires that DoD perform these tradeoffs, and the 
statute calls for compromises to performance requirements be put in place when 
appropriate to ensure achievable and cost effective systems. While not a new 
concept for DoD, WSARA shifts this tradeoff process to the earliest possible 
phase in system acquisition. This has the potential to reduce subsequent cost, 
schedule, and performance risk. However, by establishing the DCAPE role 
without further clarifying processes, WSARA and DoDI 5000.02 amendments 
regarding tradeoff analyses also have the potential to increase tradeoff 
completion time and delay completion of Material Solution Analysis phase. To 
maximize the benefit of this policy, DoD should seek to streamline and 
standardize the process of conducting these tradeoffs and the DCAPE role. 
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III. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES TO ENSURE COMPETITION 
THROUGHOUT THE LIFE CYCLE OF MAJOR DEFENSE 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), by 
requiring DoD to implement acquisition strategies that ensure competition, takes 
a prescriptive approach to defining the justifications and requirements of 
acquisition strategy development. Acknowledging shifts in the government 
acquisition workforce’s capabilities and the continued reduction in the industrial 
base, this legislation aims to provide direction regarding how competition should 
be considered in DoD acquisition. This direction is far more explicit than in 
previous policy, and requires DoD to establish selection criteria and authorities 
not previously explored or encouraged. The emphasis on continued competition 
through the life cycle is recognition of the common practice of establishing follow-
on support directly with the prime vendor. 
The GAO has observed, “increased globalization in the defense industry 
and consolidation of the defense supplier base into a few prime contractors has 
reduced competition” (GAO-09-05 p. 1). The perceived threat from increased 
globalization is that the use of foreign versus domestic suppliers could erode 
ability of U.S. industry to source critical technologies. This presents both a 
national security risk, as well as a negative economic impact to U.S. domestic 
industry. The reduction in overall industrial base is in part due to government-
supported consolidation of private defense industry in the early 1990s. This 
reduced set of available sources has set the stage for routine establishment of 
sole-source contracts after conducting initial development competitions. 
A GAO study conducted in 2004 revealed that “competition requirements 
were waived for nearly half (34 of 74) of the multiple-award contract and federal 
supply schedule orders GAO reviewed” (GAO-04-874). With a reduced set of 
industry firms to draw upon, program offices were able to make stronger 
rationalizations in waiving the requirements for competition for subsequent 
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production and support contracts. This has led to a DoD culture that has set a 
strong precedent for contracting officers to waive competition requirements 
based on the need to retain the services of current contractors. GAO found that 
“safeguards to ensure that waivers were granted only under appropriate 
circumstances were lacking. Specifically, guidance for granting waivers did not 
sufficiently describe the circumstances under which a waiver of competition could 
be used” (GAO-04-874). Further enabling this continued erosion of regular 
competition was the reduction in the government acquisition workforce. The 
rigorous effort required by regular competition has become an even more 
demanding effort with fewer skilled acquisition professionals. As a symptom of 
this culture, DoD has focused on making expeditious contract awards through a 
sole-source process late in the life cycle, however, “the focus on speed has come 
at the expense of sound contracting techniques” (GAO-06-838R, p. 2). 
WSARA requires a more detailed discussion of competition in the 
program’s Acquisition Strategy than called for in past law and regulation. Unlike 
past regulation, a specific set of measures to be taken are identified, such as the 
following. 
 Competitive prototyping 
 Dual-sourcing 
 Unbundling of contracts 
 Funding of next-generation prototype systems or subsystems 
 Use of modular, open architectures to enable competition for 
upgrades 
 Use of build-to-print approaches to enable production through 
multiple sources 
 Acquisition of complete technical data packages 
 Periodic competitions for subsystem upgrades 
 Licensing of additional suppliers 
 Periodic system or program reviews to address long-term 
competitive effects of program decisions (WSARA s. 202(b)) 
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Several of these techniques run contrary to practices or perceptions 
encouraged in previous acquisition law and policy. Identification of use of build-
to-print approaches for multiple sources is a signal that continued competition 
using purely performance-based specifications may, in some cases, prove to be 
a hindrance to competition rather than promoting it. This measure will minimize 
the government’s costs for non-recurring engineering should multiple sources be 
sought during the production cycle. Closely tied to this is the measure of 
“acquisition of complete technical data packages.” While recognized by DoD 
acquisition organizations as a critical objective to achieve during competition, 
identification of this in the new acquisition law is a clear enabler to engaging 
multiple sources during production and sustainment. 
Unlike past regulations, such as DoDI 5000.2, the WSARA prescribes the 
need for competition during Operation and Sustainment (O&S) phases of a 
program’s life cycle. WSARA section 202(d), titled “Consideration of Competition 
Throughout Operation and Sustainment of Major Weapon Systems,” calls for the 
Secretary of Defense to ensure that competition is provided for to the maximum 
extent, “whenever a decision regarding source of repair results in a plan to award 
a contract for performance of maintenance and sustainment of a major weapon 
system.” This differs from past regulation which does not specifically identify O&S 
requirements, instead simply stating, “…throughout the life” of an acquisition 
program (DoDI 5000.2 s 4.7.1.5). The specificity of WSARA on this point can be 
interpreted as recognition of the frequent reliance by DoD on prime production 
sources to meet O&S requirements. 
In another critical difference between WSARA and past acquisition policy, 
the new law requires that Acquisition Strategies make provisions for ensuring 
competition at both the prime and subcontract levels. This includes requiring that 
prime contractors’ make or buy decisions give “full and fair consideration” to 
qualified sources other than themselves for major subsystems and components. 
This may run contrary to a contractor’s business decision, but is now considered 
to be a requirement on the contractor. WSARA also requires DoD to provide for 
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government surveillance of how the prime selects subcontractors and use this as 
consideration in source selection decisions. Competition in subcontracting has 
been enforced in the past through the use of contractor purchasing system 
reviews; however, the explicit statement in WSARA that subcontract competition 
shall be a source selection criterion makes this a critical concept in a contractor’s 
proposal and provides the government with a strong method of enforcement. 
WSARA requires DoD to rigorously pursue competition in its acquisition 
strategies. The law prescribes specific measures to be included in acquisition 
strategies, and introduces new requirements as compared to previous acquisition 
policy. There is an increased emphasis on maintaining competition during the 
O&S phase of a program’s life cycle. Given the measures now encouraged by 
the law, such as use of build-to-print to maintain multiple production sources, and 
competition of subsystem upgrades, it seems likely that the WSARA will achieve 
moderate increases in the number of competitions held throughout the DoD. 
Coupling the WSARA with previous acquisition policies that required an increase 
in DoD acquisition workforce size, it appears that DoD is poised to have both the 
explicit direction and workforce capability to follow through on Acquisition 
Strategies that improve the quantity of life cycle competitions. 
An area of challenge to the DoD will be the act’s direction to thrust the 
government further into subcontract management. Because the law requires that 
DoD adopt strategies maximizing contractor subcontract policy, program offices 
may find they are forced into a position of mandating or negotiating subcontract 
activity. While the Government was faced with some of these challenges in the 
past, such as mandating percentages allocated to small business, disadvantaged 
business, women owned, minority owned, or enterprise zone vendors, the active 
management of these activities was typically left to the prime contractor. Unless 
strict boundaries are defined and enforced, the new policy could lead to potential 
conflicts with the prime contractor whereby the government is forced to assume 
responsibility for subcontractor actions and performance. Business, technical 
development, manufacturing, and sustainment practices were all risk areas 
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previously assumed by the prime contractor, and the Government may not be 
well suited to actively engage in this arena. Additionally, the WSARA requires 
that DoD make provisions to continually monitor subcontract management 
processes, which could result in increased costs to the government to develop 
personnel and processes, as well as the subsequent increases in contractor 
deliverables, such as reports and monitoring systems. Application of the WSARA 
direction in this area should be executed in a rigorously formal manner with 
frequent guidance from DoD’s contracting officers and legal counsel, as direct 
government intervention in the contractor-to-sub contractor process could 
increase risk to DoD. 
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IV. PROTOTYPING REQUIREMENTS FOR MDAPS 
Section 203 of The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
(WSARA) requires, 
(1) That the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition 
program provides for competitive prototypes before Milestone B approval 
(or Key Decision Point B approval in the case of a space program) unless 
the Milestone Decision Authority for such program waives the requirement 
pursuant to paragraph (2). 
(2) That the Milestone Decision Authority may waive the requirement in 
paragraph (1) only— 
(A) on the basis that the cost of producing competitive prototypes exceeds 
the expected life-cycle benefits (in constant dollars) of producing such 
prototypes, including the benefits of improved performance and increased 
technological and design maturity that may be achieved through 
competitive prototyping; or  
(B) on the basis that, but for such waiver, the Department would be unable 
to meet critical national security objectives. 
(3) That whenever a Milestone Decision Authority authorizes a waiver 
pursuant to paragraph (2), the Milestone Decision Authority— 
(A) shall require that the program produce a prototype before Milestone B 
approval (or Key Decision Point B approval in the case of a space 
program) if the expected life-cycle benefits (in constant dollars) of 
producing such prototype exceed its cost and its production is consistent 
with achieving critical national security objectives; and 
(B) shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing not later 
than 30 days after the waiver is authorized and include in such notification 
the rationale for the waiver and the plan, if any, for producing a prototype. 
(4) That prototypes may be required under paragraph (1) 
or (3) for the system to be acquired or, if prototyping of the system is not 
feasible, for critical subsystems of the system. (Weapons System 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 S. 454 p. 19) 
 
In comparison to the old act, this act targets acquisition programs during 
the Materiel Solution Analysis and Technology Development phases, rather than 
when programs reach the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase. 
This is not a completely new concept for DoD programs since the focus has for 
some time been geared to development planning from conception to Milestone A. 
However, with the development of competitive prototyping, this can help translate 
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user needs and opportunities into demonstrable solutions before Milestone B  
approval. WSARA reinforces the requirement for additional oversight and 
management of weapon systems to assure better control, minimizing cost over-
runs, and better meeting the schedule time frames.  
Virtually every proponent of acquisition reform contends competition is an 
effective way of disciplining the price and performance of contractors. A recent 
report by the Defense Business Board stressed the value of having multiple 
sources for military systems (Thompson, 2010). However, the logic of 
competition in the commercial world does not necessarily operate in the defense 
marketplace, because there is only one customer–the government–and only two 
or three qualified suppliers for any particular product (Thompson, 2010). That 
means if the government wants two sources, it will have to pay for multiple 
designs, production lines, labor forces and spare-parts inventories (Werfel, 2010, 
p. 18). Also, to sustain two sources of any given item, the government will have 
to split demand between two suppliers in a way that undercuts economies of 
scale. The Bush administration concluded, “…buying an alternate engine for the 
F-35 fighter was a waste of money….” Bush’s advisors did not believe the cost of 
sustaining two sources would ever be covered by savings from competition 
(DefenseNews, 2010, p. 29). Essentially, every program should incorporate an 
aggressive but sensible prototyping program to build and test non-production 
prototypes that can offer significantly enhanced capabilities to the warfighter 
(Business Executives for National Security, 2009). When defining the increased 
costs of multiple sources and competitive prototyping, acquisition offices should 
be prepared to also identify the potential long-term production and sustainment 
savings anticipated due to increased opportunities for competition during the 
system’s life cycle. 
DoD should increase its reliance on private industry for improved 
technology. High priority should be put on building and testing prototype systems 
to demonstrate new technology and provide a basis for realistic cost estimates 
prior to a full-scale development decision. This should be done with all weapon 
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systems, as the only consistently reliable way to get information regarding 
performance is by using prototypes that embody new technology. Research and 
development, including operational testing, should employ extensive competition 
with streamlined processes. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) should engage in prototyping and other work on joint programs and in 
areas not adequately emphasized by the Services. Section 203 of the WSARA is 
certainly designed to focus on fixing what is broken, not what works. The current 
acquisition does eventually deliver the most sophisticated weapons and 
comprehensive support services any military force has ever possessed, but it 
does so far too slowly and at vastly greater cost than necessary; we cannot 
afford to provide the warfighter with products inefficiently. This legal requirement 
for competitive prototyping prior to Milestone B should provide necessary and 
long overdue changes. If we fail to conform to the law, we will abet an 
increasingly sclerotic defense acquisition process that may one day no longer be 
able to supply American war fighters with the means to assure this nation’s 
freedom and security. If we do not act now, with many advantages still in hand, 
we will have to act later in far less propitious circumstances (Business Executives 
for National Security, 2009). DoD should make greater use of components, 
systems, and services available “off the shelf” from private industry. New or 
custom-made items should only be developed when they are not readily 
available or are inadequate to meet military requirements. Program sponsors 
often lack the incentives to present objective risk assessments, report realistic 
cost estimates, or perform thorough tests of prototypes when such measures run 
the risk of exposing programs to disruption, deferral, or even cancellation. As a 
result, there is an unacceptable level of cost growth, performance problems, and 
schedule delays. In this sense, acquisition system problems are the collective 
responsibility of all the participants. 
In conclusion, the WSARA’s requirement for competitive prototyping prior 
to Milestone B approval represents an important example of how the defense 
acquisition system can effectively react to meet war fighter needs. An article 
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entitled “Acquisition Reform ‘Logic,’” stated, “the Defense Department wastes 
billions every year on poorly managed programs and processes and many 
reformers raise doubts about whether the WSARA’s latest campaign will turn out 
any better than previous failed efforts” (Thompson, 2010, p. 29). WSARA 
encourages oversight and management of weapon systems to assure better 
control and minimize cost over-runs and provide better ability of meeting the 
schedule time frame. Competitive prototyping will aid DoD in selection of the best 
design, whether product, part or system (McKenna, Long, & Aldridge, 2009). 
Competitive prototyping can help the government to understand the best design, 
best contractor, and most reasonable cost. Competitive prototyping encourages 
(use of COTS) as this will reduce the cost and be more competitive. Competitive 
prototyping may increase costs upfront, but is likely to clarify technical issues, 
and best values. Small upfront cost increase is expected to pay large dividends 
in terms of reduced Total Ownership Cost, R-TOC. 
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V. ACTIONS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS SYSTEMIC 
PROBLEMS IN MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
PRIOR TO MILESTONE B APPROVAL 
Section 204 of The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
(WSARA) requires that the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must submit a 
report within 30 days after receiving notification from a program manager that the 
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) is experiencing cost or schedule 
delays of 25 percent or more prior to Milestone B approval. Those programs that 
have not received a Milestone B approval and were also not previously subject to 
a review under section 2366a of Title 10 United States Code (USC), relating to 
the requirements for Milestone B are to be reviewed against criteria similar to that 
required for Milestone A certification. That report submitted by MDA will provide 
the defense and appropriations committees the information needed for identifying 
the root causes of the cost or schedule growth and appropriate metrics for 
assessing the program. The report will also certify that the program is essential to 
national security, there are no lower cost alternatives, new cost and schedule 
estimates are reasonable, and the program management structure is adequate. 
This act invokes a “Nunn-McCurdy” like review for pre-MS B and pre-MDAPs; 
therefore, MDA must review the program and consider termination. Certification, 
if not terminated, must be provided to Congress. The report to the defense and 
appropriations committees should identify: (1) the root causes of the cost or 
schedule growth and (2) appropriate acquisition performance measures for the 
remainder of the MDAP’s development. The report should include either: (1) a 
certification of the necessity of the MDAP or (2) a plan for terminating MDAP 
development or withdrawing Milestone A or Key Decision Point A approval 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2009). 
In comparison to the old act, this act further requires the identification and 
addressing of systemic problems before Milestone B approval, while programs 
are still in the technology development phase. In addition, the act further modifies 
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the requirements for review of MDAPs that experience critical cost growth 
breaches under Nunn-McCurdy. The new act requires the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) to terminate an MDAP that meets or exceeds its critical cost growth 
threshold, unless deemed otherwise by the Secretary of Defense. The act 
requires the restructured program to return to the last milestone decision point for 
review. This in turn requires the Secretary to rescind the most recent milestone 
approval and suspend all contract actions relating to the program until completion 
of a new milestone review. It also requires unit cost reports to include all 
expenditures and all planned increments or spirals of the program in calculating 
its total procurement expenditure (Business Executive, 2009). The additions and 
changes to section 204 should help reduce the problems associated with cost 
and schedule deviation resulting in cost and schedule overruns. Providing 
additional government oversight to these programs and establishing the root 
cause will in turn end with a better product and/or system for the war fighter. 
Increased time or expenditures for early testing and development might be 
indicators that a program is troubled and needs to be terminated or restructured. 
However, the great investment in time and resources during the Technology 
Development phase results in better overall program performance and lower 
overall program costs. 
Table 1 provides a detailed status for each provision, including the 
requirements of the provisions, any deadline, and the current known status of its 














Table 1.   Provisions to Address Systemic Problems Prior to Milestone B 
Requirements Deadline Implementation 







 Requires MDA to 
determine “root 
cause” of cost or 
schedule growth as 






program, and report 
such to Congress.  
 
 Each ongoing and 
not yet certified 
MDAP shall be 
certified in 
accordance with the 
requirements of 10 

























 NLT one year after 
enactment. 
 Requirements for 
MDA program 
certification at 
Milestone A (10 














 Ongoing MDAPs 
initiated prior to 
May 22, 2009 and 





certification prior to 
May 22, 2010, must 
receive a Milestone 
A certification NLT 
May 22, 2010. 
 
Since the beginning of 2006, nearly half of DoD’s 95 Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) have experienced critical cost growth, as defined 
in the Nunn-McCurdy provision, as amended. Overall, these 95 MDAPs have 
exceeded their research and development budgets by an average of 40 percent, 
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seen their acquisition costs grow by an average of 26 percent, and experienced 
an average schedule delay of almost two years. Such cost growth has become 
so pervasive that it may come to be viewed as an expected and acceptable 
occurrence in the life of a weapons program. The revised act contained in 
Section 204 would address this problem and enhance the use of Nunn-McCurdy 
as a management tool by requiring MDAPs that experience critical cost growth: 
(1) be terminated unless the Secretary certifies (with reasons and supporting 
documentation) that continuing the program is essential to national security and 
the program can be modified to proceed in a cost-effective manner, and (2) 
receive a new milestone approval (and associated certification) prior to the award 
of any new contract or contract modification extending the scope of the program. 
In accordance with section 104, a certification as to the reasonableness of costs 
would have to be supported by an independent cost estimate and a stated 
confidence level for that estimate (Levin & Carl, 2009). In passing the WSARA, 
Congress sought to minimize waste and inefficiency by codifying acquisition 
reforms that impose more transparency and oversight at an early point – before 
programs reach the development phase. Therefore, increased time or 
expenditures for early testing and development should only be taken as 





VI. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN MDAPS 
The additional requirements levied by WSARA Section 205 are motivated 
by years of MDAP cost and schedule overruns and performance issues that often 
were not manifested until late in the acquisition process. It is not uncommon for 
programs to proceed past Milestone A, and sometimes beyond Milestone B, with 
unsettled Key Performance Parameters (KPP). (National Research Council) In 
this analysis, we highlight some of the changes made to past acquisition policy 
by WSARA to prevent these MDAP cost overruns in the future. This includes new 
requirements facing MDAPs and the advantages or disadvantages of these 
additional requirements. Finally, we provide conclusions and recommendations 
based on our analysis. 
Previous acquisition processes allowed MDAPs to start with unproven 
technologies, allowing programs to proceed down an acquisition path with high 
risk to system development. This process allowed systems to be developed 
without having the requirements clearly defined. Subsequent re-baselining efforts 
did not solve the problem’s root cause (immature technology); rather, the risk 
was moved to a later phase of the acquisition. With the new law, Congress has 
stepped up and provided a legal and binding means to establish control of issues 
related to cost, schedule, and performance. Congress has stated that any system 
that goes into Engineering and Manufacturing Development under a waiver of 
some of the statutory criteria after Milestone B must be reviewed annually. 
Programs receiving MS B approval on the basis of a waiver of any of the 
statutory certification criteria must be reviewed by the MDA at least annually until 
they meet all of the criteria and must be flagged in any budget documentation for 
Congress. This amends the 2366b certification process to include a mandatory 
Preliminary Design Review before Milestone B (which will require a change to 
current acquisition policy). It requires semi-annual reviews of programs that are 
not terminated following a Nunn-McCurdy breach, until one year after the date 
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that such programs receive a new milestone approval. It applies the 2366b 
certification process to programs that received Milestone B approval prior to 
2366b certification requirements, but have not yet received Milestone C approval 
(S.454-22 WSARA 2009 Section 205 para (b) (1)). 
This additional requirement is an effort by Congress to get a handle on the 
cost and schedule issues earlier in the acquisition process. Those MDAPs 
experiencing APB breaches will be subjected to more stringent reporting 
requirements to Congress, now required twice per year instead of once per year 
as originally prescribed. This change to the Nunn-McCurdy Act forces the MDAP 
to get the system cost back in line with the APB, or the program is subject to 
termination. The new law includes measures to conduct a Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR), and a Post-PDR Assessment prior to Milestone B, keeping the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) engaged in the development of the system. 
In accordance with the new law, MDAPs are required to inform the Congress of 
any problems with the program as follows: 
DESIGNATION OF CERTIFICATION STATUS IN BUDGET 
DOCUMENTATION.—Any budget request, budget justification 
material, budget display, reprogramming request, Selected 
Acquisition Report, or other budget documentation or performance 
report submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President 
regarding a major defense acquisition program receiving a waiver 
pursuant to subsection (d) shall prominently and clearly indicate 
that such program has not fully satisfied the certification 
requirements of this section until such time as the milestone 
decision authority makes the determination that such program has 
satisfied all such certification components. (S.-454 WSARA 2009 
sec 205 para (b)(3)) 
This notification is achieved by providing relevant information to the Congress 
when submitting budget documents. WSARA forces the MDAPs to focus on the 
root cause of problems and bring these issues to resolution, instead of delaying 
resolution until the next major milestone. As an expected consequence, DoD will 
mitigate earlier, and at less expense, some of the problems that plague MDAPs 
as they move through the acquisition lifecycle process. 
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A major disadvantage of WSARA Section 205 requirements is the 
likelihood of delays in achieving Milestone B. Due to the efforts of Congress to be 
more engaged in MDAP acquisitions, systems may be delayed in progressing 
through acquisition milestones because of increased reporting requirements. 
WSARA forces the MDAP to resolve problems early in the process to reduce 
cost overruns typically encountered late in the acquisition process. One of the 
byproducts of resolving the problem(s) early is delaying Milestone B. This will 
stretch out the acquisition time schedule. Urgently needed MDAPs in the 
Technology Development Phase (a pre-acquisition phase) will feel severe 
pressure to obtain program approval and move into Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development. 
The reason for these additional requirements is to validate maturity of the 
technology and design to minimize the cost, schedule, and performance impact 
to weapon systems before moving to Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) or full 
rate production. A risk inherent with the associated delays while validating 
maturity is that the user community will introduce new requirements.  
Pre or Post Milestone B PDR Assessment provides the MDA with the 
ability to determine which system best meets performance criteria and 
establishes the hardware, software, and human support systems to support the 
development of the MDAP. This level of confidence comes with a technical 
maturity level commensurate with the successful completion of PDR assessment. 
A successful PDR assessment gives the MDA the ability to recommend the 
requirement tradeoffs based upon an assessment of acceptable cost, schedule, 
and performance risk.  
Successful PDR Assessment and demonstration of the maturity of 
relevant technologies at an appropriate TRL should provide the MDA with the 
necessary confidence to advance the program into Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development for completion of the detailed design of the 
warfighting system and testing of production-like prototype systems. 
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VII. CRITICAL COST GROWTH IN MDAPS 
As we look at the issue of Critical Cost Growth in WSARA Section 206, it 
is apparent, as with any reform effort that a certain amount of buy-in has to be 
obtained. Critical cost growth within Major Defense Acquisition Programs is a 
problem, and continues to be a problem for Program/Project Managers today. In 
dealing with the issue of cost growth we will look and some of the MDAPs 
programs that have experienced cost growth. We will see the effects on the 
programs financially. We will see what some of the causes of cost growth are, 
and how WSARA will address some of the issues of cost growth. We will see the 
impact of cost growth on other programs. We will explore some of the ways 
WSARA is attempting to deal will with cost growth, and how MDAPs determine 
they are experiencing cost growth. We will also discuss some of the impacts on 
the MDAPs, and identify that technology maturity has a direct correlation to cost 
growth. As a byproduct of reform, we are trying to affect the process by getting 
better outcomes on requirements, funding and the acquisition of weapon systems 
by doing this balancing act. After all the evaluations, it is still boiling down to what 
systems are going to be eliminated or not because of the systemic issues that 
cannot be resolved or indentified at the outset. 
Under the Nunn McCurdy Act (amended), the PM shall notify the DoD 
component acquisition executive (CAE) immediately, whenever there is an actual 
cost breach. The PM must also report if there is a reasonable cause to believe 
that the current estimate of either the program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) or 
average procurement unit cost (APUC) of a MDAP or designated subprogram (in 
base-year dollars) has increased by 25 percent (or more) over the PAUC or 
APUC objective of the currently approved APB estimate, or 50 percent (or more) 
over the PAUC or APUC of the original APB estimate. 
One of the major tenets of WSARA is the process of identifying the root 
cause via Root Cause Analysis—a process for identifying the basic or causal 
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factor(s) that underlie variation in performance, including the occurrence or 
possible occurrence. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviews 
programs designated as “JROC interest” and supports the acquisition review 
process in accordance with law (10 U.S.C. 181). The JROC along with the 
Secretary of Defense and the newly established Director of Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (DCAPE) determine the cost of completing the system 
that breaches the Nunn Mc Curdy thresholds. Additionally, the USD(AT&L), after 
consultation with the JROC regarding program requirements, shall determine the 
root cause or causes of the critical cost growth in accordance with applicable 
statutory requirements and DoD policies, procedures, and guidance based upon 
the root cause analysis conducted by the senior official for Program Assessment 
and Cost Analysis (PARCA); and in consultation with the DCAPE, they shall 
carry out an assessment of the following. 
 The projected cost of completing the program if current 
requirements are not modified 
 The projected cost of completing the program based on reasonable 
modification of such requirements 
 The rough order of magnitude of the costs of any reasonable 
alternative system or capability 
 The need to reduce funding for other programs due to the growth in 
cost of the program 
Below are GAO charts on MDAP to show that these high visibility systems 
are susceptible to the same cost growth issues as smaller weapon systems. 
Also, because GAO is the investigative arm of the Congress, the latter is aware 
of the issue of cost growth.  WSARA is an effort by the Congress to provide more 
rigor and teeth with which to combat cost growth on MDAPs. In Table 2, the data 
shows that growth is not just isolated in a particular military sector or Department; 
rather, it is an issue for all DoD components. Looking at weapons systems 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), many systems were experiencing 
significant cost growth. The first GAO chart translates into weapons systems 
funding mismatches that resulted largely due to erroneous cost estimates or 
program cost growth. Slightly less than half of the weapons systems have 
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exceeded the Nunn McCurdy breach criteria and this also translated into 
increased schedule variances. After seeing the extent of the cost variances, one 
might ask, “what is an acceptable level of variance from the original Acquisition 
Program baseline before a system should be terminated?” 
 
Table 2.   Analysis of DoD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios 
Fiscal Year 2009 Dollars 
 Fiscal Year 
 2003 2007 2008 
Portfolio size  
Number of programs  77 95 96 
Total planned commitments  $1.2 trillion $1.6 trillion $1.6 trillion 
Commitments outstanding  $724.2 billion $875.2 billion $786.3 billion 
Portfolio indicators  
Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate 37 percent 40 percent 42 percent 
Change to total acquisition cost from first 
estimate  
19 percent 26 percent 25 percent 
Total acquisition cost growth  $183 billion $301.3 billion
a
 $296.4 billion 
Share of programs with 25 percent increase in 
program acquisition unit cost growth  
41 percent 44 percent 42 percent 
Average schedule delay in delivering initial 
capabilities  
18 months 21 months 22 months 
Source: GAO analysis of DoD data.  
Notes: Data was obtained from DoD’s Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) (dated December 
2002, 2006, and 2007). In a few cases, data were obtained directly from program offices. The 
number of programs reflects the programs with SARs; however, in our analysis we have broken 
a few SAR programs into smaller elements or programs. Not all programs had comparable cost 
and schedule data and these programs were excluded from the analysis where appropriate. 
Portfolio performance data do not include costs of developing Missile Defense Agency 
elements or the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program. 
The total acquisition cost growth for the 2007 portfolio was $295 billion in 2008 constant dollars 
(GAO-09-663T, p. 0). 
 
Table 3, below, illustrates overall performance in terms of buying power.  
As a point of interest, this portfolio is one indicator of how accurately DoD’s 
acquisition system meets its investment promises—from the perspective of the 
taxpayer and the warfighter. 
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Another is the effect cost increases have on DoD’s  
buying power for individual systems, as demonstrated by changes in program 
acquisition unit costs. Some examples that illustrate the effect of lost buying 
power are shown in Table 3. 
There is no single measure that perfectly explains every variable that 
influences cost growth and schedule slips in weapon systems acquistion. For 
example, the total cost of a weapon system can increase because more 
quantities are added, without necessarily being indicative of a problem. On the 
other hand, the total cost can stay the same while quantities are significantly 
reduced—a clear indication of a problem. While there can be legitimate debate 
over what set of measures best explain problem, as Table 2 shows, there can be 
no debate over the fact that the cost growth is significant and calls for action 
(GAO-09-663T, p. 2). 
 
Table 3.   Effect of Lost Buying Power 
 
Effect of Cost 
Increases on Buying 
Power Total cost(fiscal 
year 2009 dollars in 
billions) 
Total quantity Acquisition unit cost 









Joint Strike Fighter  206.4 244.8 2,866 2,456 38.4 
Future Combat 
System  




4.4 12.2 5 4 244.7 
Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicle  




Lift Aircraft  
38.7 55.5 913 458 185.9 
2
The program acquisition unit cost is the total cost for development and procurement of, 
and system-specific military construction for, the acquisition program divided by the 
number of fully configured end items to be produced. 10 USC § 2432 (a)(1). (GAO-09-
663T, p. 2) 
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Cost growth in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) has been a 
problem throughout the history of weapon systems. The above tables and 
explanations provide actual recent data to support the fact that cost growth is still 
affecting MDAPs. Cost growth is an issue that impacts all MDAP stakeholders. 
Due to the complex nature of weapon system development, the risk of cost 
growth has a high likelihood. Some level of cost growth may be deemed to be 
acceptable, assuming the Program Manager (PM) can account for this or 
mitigate the cost impacts through adjustments to other aspects of the program. 
However, it should be recognized that because a system is showing progress in 
meeting the milestone goals, this does not mean technology maturity issues and 
other program risks have been mitigated or are being addressed. The notion that 
capabilities should be fielded regardless of the cost borne by the government is 
falling on deaf ears as DoD budgets are getting tighter. This mentality has caught 
up with the federal government, because there is no bottomless pot of money. 
WSARA approaches cost growth as an indicator of something seriously 
wrong in the design or development of the MDAP. In the past, PMs were able to 
re-baseline the program as long as there was technical progress being made, or 
the rationale for cost growth was reasonable. Cost growth under WSARA has 
negative consequences and demands the PM control cost related to the design 
or technology issues facing the program, or risk program cancellation and an 
intense level of scrutiny, accompanied by corrective action reporting. WSARA 
reflects Congress’ recognition of cost growth in DoD, the unhappiness of the 
Congress with lack of cost discipline in DoD, and the intent of the Congress to 
see that cost indiscipline be fixed. Congress has clearly bought into GAO logic 
that technological immaturity is a major cost driver that may require draconian 
response; even to the extent of program cancellations. WSARA requires that a 
PM experiencing critical cost growth conduct an extensive root cause analysis to 
flush out the reason for the problem(s) in the program. Also, the ability to re-
baseline will not be as easy as it has been in the past. There has been more 
reporting rigor put into Nunn-McCurdy breach requirements; unit cost reports are 
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required, and restructuring of programs may be required before gaining MDA 
approval to proceed, and also, the current approval may be rescinded. These 
consequences put more pressure on the PM to address critical MDAP problems 
earlier in the acquisition life cycle versus delaying problem resolution to later in 
the program when the cost of change is more expensive and difficult to do. If 
from the outset the program has established an evolutionary acquisition 
approach then the issues should not be if the capability can be field but more 
along the lines of how can we improve the capability. 
An advantage of the new law is the focus on problem root cause analysis. 
The law forces the MDAP to make design or technology risk decisions early in 
the acquisition process. Early risk mitigation planning is anticipated to save cost 
on redesign and schedule issues later in the acquisition process. Establishment 
of the different levels of criticality for Nunn-McCurdy breaches provides for 
appropriate levels of reporting and response consequences. Reporting 
requirements are based on the severity of the breach of the Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB). Additionally, the new law does not allow the MDAP to re-
baseline without restructuring to circumvent the cost issue. These force the 
MDAP to come up with acceptable restructure plans that gain the MDA’s 
approval to move forward. 
A disadvantage of early issue resolution due to implementation of WSARA 
is the potential delay in moving through early milestones. WSARA 
implementations and tightening up of the criteria related to Nunn-McCurdy 
breaches do not mean fewer breaches and fewer consequences; rather, these 
Congressional actions mean more breaches with more thorough associated 
review and the presumption of program termination. This cannot be looked at as 
an unintended consequence of the law; on the contrary, this must be recognized 
as a direct response to the lack of DoD cost discipline, shown to be habitual over 
many years. 
WSARA’s provisions to address critical cost growth result in the warfighter 
receiving capability from a restructured weapon system program with fewer 
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deficiencies. It is more likely that programs must be more careful in their 
selection of mature technology and the need to avoid use of technology that has 
not been proven. This may likely force programs into evolutionary acquisition, 
rather than reaching for the objective solution that is more risky. Also, with 
budgets getting smaller, the earlier DoD can get a handle on technical risk, the 
more funding will be available to fund other development programs. Reporting 
and oversight due to APB breaches have been increased, forcing the MDAP to 
report as often as semi-annually based on the severity of the breach. This keeps 
Congress and DoD engaged in the development of the weapon system and 
inevitably causes increase in workload and reporting. Unfortunately, this burdens 
the PM and steals valuable time that otherwise might have been expended in 
resolving the issue. This level of oversight comes with a price, requiring 
investment and development of personnel that can carry the torch of success 
within increasingly complex MDAPs. As WSARA implementation takes shape, 
DoD will have to take into consideration the potential increases in workforce 
necessary to support WSARA requirements. Moreover, facts show that you must 
also recognize that the intention is to discourage gambling with taxpayer funds 
on technology that has not demonstrated the requisite level of maturity. There is 
a big penalty for gambling and losing—it is probably not worth the risk for either 
the PM or the PEO. 
Recommendations related to this issue of critical cost growth include 
maintaining the Congressional involvement and oversight to the level the law 
requires. The PM/PEO’s establishment of policies for root cause analysis of 
failure, and development of PEO/agency-wide reporting process to streamline 
reporting for Nunn-McCurdy requirements would be great initiatives to assist in 
the decrease of cost growth as a whole. Furthermore, there should be emphasis 
that immature technology is a trap and should be watched for and avoided. The 
minor recommendation is the possible need for increased PMO personnel and 
the expectation that programs schedule estimates are going to be lengthened. 
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VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MDAPS 
Section 207 of the WSARA has various tenants, listed below, that are 
intended to protect MDAPs from conflict of interest (COI) issues that arise when 
companies are the source and the supplier of information to the MDAPs. WSARA 
is put into place to minimize those conflicts when possible. There are certain 
exceptions, such as the case of diminishing sources. These exceptions can 
influence the effectiveness of the law; nonetheless, that does not reduce the 
requirement for these provisions. The law identifies provisions regarding COI as 
follows: 
Elements- The revised regulations required by subsection (a) shall, 
at a minimum-- 
(1) Address organizational conflicts of interest that could 
arise as a result of-- 
(A) Lead system integrator contracts on major 
defense acquisition programs and contracts that 
follow lead system integrator contracts on such 
programs, particularly contracts for production; 
(B) the ownership of business units performing 
systems engineering and technical assistance 
functions, professional services, or management 
support services in relation to major defense 
acquisition programs by contractors who 
simultaneously own business units competing to 
perform as either the prime contractor or the supplier 
of a major subsystem or component for such 
programs; 
(C) the award of major subsystem contracts by a 
prime contractor for a major defense acquisition 
program to business units or other affiliates of the 
same parent corporate entity, and particularly the 
award of subcontracts for software integration or the 
development of a proprietary software system 
architecture; or 
(D) The performance by, or assistance of, contractors 
in technical evaluations on major defense acquisition 
programs; 
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(2) ensure that the Department of Defense receives advice 
on systems architecture and systems engineering matters 
with respect to major defense acquisition programs from 
federally funded research and development centers or other 
sources independent of the prime contractor; 
(3) require that a contract for the performance of systems 
engineering and technical assistance functions for a major 
defense acquisition program contains a provision prohibiting 
the contractor or any affiliate of the contractor from 
participating as a prime contractor or a major subcontractor 
in the development or construction of a weapon system 
under the program; and 
(4) Establish such limited exceptions to the requirement in 
paragraphs (2) and (3) as may be necessary to ensure that 
the Department of Defense has continued access to advice 
on systems architecture and systems engineering matters 
from highly qualified contractors with domain experience and 
expertise, while ensuring that such advice comes from 
sources that are objective and unbiased. (Weapons System 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 S. 454, p. 25) 
MDAPs have always faced the issue of potential COI when soliciting 
advice from contractors. This is because of the sheer magnitude of MDAP 
complexity. MDAPs are forced into situations where a prime contractor may have 
an affiliation with a sub-contractor providing support to the MDAP as a technical 
or acquisition advisor. This vested interest in the technical advice and planning 
being provided to the government causes the appearance of COI. Government 
acquisition offices must establish responsibilities that are inherently 
governmental, and ensure government employees are performing these activities 
without undue influence from private industry, while maintaining the ability to get 
work done in the most efficient and effective manner possible. In recent years, 
MDAP’s were giving the contractor substantial decision-making power over the 
direction of the program due to the government’s insufficient acquisition 
workforce and its dependence on contractor support. This put the government in 




inherently governmental issues, such as statements of work, engineering 
requirements, and various other aspects of acquisition management related to 
competition. 
WSARA’s primary challenge in ensuring acquisition integrity is enabling 
the government to execute acquisition programs without major schedule delays 
and cost overruns while avoiding COI. Meeting that challenge has been the goal 
of acquisition reform improvements for decades. With the implementation of 
WSARA, Congress is stating that the time is right for renewed efforts to improve 
the performance of the defense acquisition system. WSARA establishes 
guidance to facilitate an improved ability to make programmatic decisions, and 
maintain and train the human capital necessary to support the sustainment of 
weapon systems. Congressional intent is to reduce the need to retain contractor 
services for management and advisory services to the MDAP execution, and 
help prevent the leak of sensitive information the could cause the government to 
lose its ability to negotiate in good faith. 
A major issue in the development of weapon systems is the separation of 
ownership within the contractor’s arena providing services to the government. 
WSARA will help maintain a level of separation that supports a healthy industrial 
base of competing companies over the long term. 
WSARA establishes the Panel on Contracting Integrity, charged with 
reviewing the progress made by DoD in eliminating areas of vulnerability to 
defense contracting systems. The panel targets vulnerabilities allowing fraud, 
waste, and abuse to occur, and recommends associated changes in law, 
regulations, and policy. The panel prepares annual reports containing a summary 
of the findings and recommendations, and submits this to Secretary of Defense. 
An advantage of the implementation of WSARA is the assurance that a 
government entity is providing leadership in contracting integrity via the Panel on 
Contracting Integrity. The law provides a surveillance arm, the Panel on 
Contracting Integrity, that makes sure the contractors are doing what they signed 
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up to do by evaluating the organizational structures of the companies.  WSARA 
provides for the establishment of a Panel on Contracting Integrity, whose 
purpose is to look into contractor organizational structures to be sure that those 
portions providing services to government offices are firewalled to ensure that 
government contract-related information is protected from dissemination. The 
Panel evaluates the criteria that protect confidentiality of advisory services to the 
MDAPs from the participating services companies and their separation from the 
prime acquisition entity. The Panel’s surveillance and fraud detection are part of 
the law that benefits all MDAPs or non-major programs dealing with contractors.  
WSARA’s modifications to the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation do not provide any specific definition of these conflicts of interest and 
of personal services contracts which have been so prevalent in acquisition 
offices, and provide some needed clarity as to the appropriate application of 
these services. 
A potential disadvantage of WSARA includes the question of whether the 
Panel on Contracting Integrity will be equipped to enforce the law. The Secretary 
of Defense may deem that the existence of the panel is not required, if MDAP 
offices do not receive adequate support or the conflict of interest issues are 
mitigated to an acceptable level. The law says as follows. 
(e) Termination- 
‘(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), the panel shall 
continue to serve until the date that is 18 months after the 
date on which the Secretary of Defense notifies the 
congressional defense committees of an intention to 
terminate the panel based on a determination that the 
activities of the panel no longer justify its continuation and 
that concerns about contracting integrity have been 
mitigated. 
‘(2) MINIMUM CONTINUING SERVICE- The panel shall 
continue to serve at least until December 31, 2011. (Weapon 
System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 S. 454, p. 25) 
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It is unknown what impact the implementation and investigative arm of the 
law will have on the cost and schedule of MDAPs with an upfront limited life or 
charter that is dependent upon the effectiveness of the panel’s mitigation of 
contracting integrity issues. With that being said, the more effective the panel is 
the more likely its services will be terminated, because within the law the 
Secretary of Defense may deem the panel has done its job effectively. The pitfall 
with any new guidance is having time to evaluate the benefits of that guidance. 
A conclusion that can be derived from the implementation of this section of 
the law is that the government acquisition offices will have an improved level of 
confidence that information they are receiving from the contractors is the best 
information that industry can offer. You might conclude that this is the intent of 
the law. The effects of implementation remain to be seen. It also may be 
concluded that the Congress intended that a governmental arm be established 
specifically to police contractor integrity in circumstances where said contractors 
are providing services in sensitive areas and where those contractors might use 
their position to take advantage of or trade in information that is government-
sensitive. The implementation of this law will require time to evaluate the success 
of the guidance. A recommendation is to continue to conduct the necessary 
surveillance and monitoring of contractor proposals and services to guarantee 
better pricing and prevent COI. To maximize efficiency and objectivity, this 
process should be standardized across acquisition agencies or PEOs. That 
within itself will be a great benefit to the taxpayer and the soldier. 
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) enacted 
seven specific areas of change from existing policy. The seven focus areas, 
identified below, led to considerable inefficiency or posed challenges to the DoD 
that WSARA is intended to correct or enhance. Implementation of the changes 
prescribed by WSARA will take significant strides in improving DoD’s acquisition 
performance, though some changes may introduce new challenges. 
A. CONSIDERATION OF TRADE-OFFS AMONG COST, SCHEDULE, AND 
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES IN DOD ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
The goal of the WSARA legislation and subsequent changes to DoDI 
5000.02 is to adequately balance cost, schedule, and performance risk during 
the requirements definition phase of program acquisition. However, it is 
questionable if cost, schedule, and performance objectives tradeoffs are reliably 
quantifiable prior to and during the analysis of alternative phase. Tradeoffs 
conducted prior to internal technology development may be inherently unreliable. 
It is recommended that negotiations regarding performance objectives be 
conducted upon completion of an analysis of alternatives and establishment of 
technology development plans. 
WSARA explicitly requires compromises to performance requirements be 
put in place when appropriate to ensure achievable and cost effective systems. 
Shifting this tradeoff process to the earliest possible phase in system acquisition 
has the potential to reduce subsequent cost, schedule, and performance risk. 
However, by establishing the DCAPE role without further clarifying processes, 
WSARA and DoDI 5000.02 amendments regarding tradeoff analyses also have 
the potential to increase tradeoff completion time and delay completion of 
Material Solution Analysis phase. To maximize the benefit of this policy, DoD 
should seek to better define the DCAPE role and streamline and standardize the 
process of conducting these tradeoffs. 
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B. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES TO ENSURE COMPETITION 
THROUGHOUT THE LIFE CYCLE OF MDAPS 
WSARA requires that DoD rigorously pursue competition in its acquisition 
strategies and prescribes specific measures to be included. There is an 
increased emphasis on maintaining competition during the O&S phase of a 
program’s life cycle. Given the measures now encouraged by the law, such as 
use of build-to-print to maintain multiple production sources, and competition of 
subsystem upgrades, it seems likely that the WSARA will achieve increases in 
the number of competitions held throughout the DoD. Coupling the WSARA with 
previous acquisition policies that required an increase in DoD acquisition 
workforce size, it appears that DoD is poised to have both the explicit direction 
and workforce capability to follow through on Acquisition Strategies that improve 
the quantity of life cycle competitions. 
WSARA also requires that DoD make provisions to continually monitor 
subcontract management processes, which could result in increased costs to the 
government to develop personnel and processes, as well as the subsequent 
increases in contractor deliverables, such as reports and monitoring systems. 
Application of the WSARA direction in this area should be executed in a 
rigorously formal manner with frequent guidance from DoD’s contracting officers 
and legal counsel, as increased government intervention in the prime contractor-
to-sub contractor process could increase risk to DoD. 
C. PROTOTYPING REQUIREMENTS FOR MDAPS 
WSARA’s requirement for competitive prototyping prior to Milestone B 
approval provides a mechanism to improve upon how the defense acquisition 
system reacts to meet war fighter needs. Competitive prototyping will aid DoD in 
procurement and evaluation of the best designs and technologies. However, the 
requirement to establish early competition comes at a cost; competitive 
prototyping will increase early RDT&E funding requirements.  These up-front cost 
increases are expected to pay large dividends in terms of reduced Total 
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Ownership Cost.  When defining the increased costs of competitive prototyping, 
acquisition offices should be prepared to also identify the potential long term 
production and sustainment savings anticipated due to increased opportunities 
for competition during the system’s life-cycle. 
D. ACTIONS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN 
MDAPS PRIOR TO MILESTONE B APPROVAL 
Past acquisition policy demonstrated an inadequate amount of oversight 
and review to assure problems with various programs didn’t reach out-of-control 
cost and schedule overruns. Systemic problems were rarely identified before 
Milestone B approval; allowing these faults to be manifested beyond the 
technology development phase where they could be most easily addressed. 
Nunn-McCurdy critical cost growth breach reporting requirements were stringent, 
but still allowed for MDAP execution without adequate program review. 
The additions and changes in WSARA section 204 should help reduce the 
problems associated with cost and schedule deviation resulting from immature 
technology or the wrong choice of technology. Providing additional government 
oversight to these programs and establishing the overrun root cause will result in 
a better match of capabilities, mature technologies, and resources. The 
requirement to establish root cause should be expected to identify system 
“culprits,” as well as systemic patterns that result in developmental cost 
increases and delays; technical or resource issues identified during Technology 
Development will help to shape realistic technology and cost expectations.  
Increased time or expenditures for early testing and development might be 
indicators that a program is troubled by immature technology and the need for 
termination or restructure of technology development that is not ready for “prime 
time.” Enforcement of WSARA’s increased oversight and reporting requirements 
during the Technology Development phase will likely result in better overall 
program performance and lower overall program costs. 
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E. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN MDAPS 
Acquisition processes established prior to WSARA allowed MDAPs to 
start with unproven technologies, allowing programs to proceed down an 
acquisition path with high risk to system development. These processes allowed 
systems to be developed without having the requirements clearly defined. 
Subsequent re-baselining efforts did not solve the programs’ problem(s) root 
cause (that is, immature or poorly chosen technology); rather, the risk was 
moved to a later phase of the acquisition. 
Additional requirements introduced in WSARA assist in validation of 
technology maturity to minimize the risk of cost, schedule, and performance 
impact to weapon systems before moving to LRIP or full rate production.  A major 
enabler to this validation is the requirement for Pre-Milestone B PDR 
Assessment. This requirement provides the MDA (prior to a Milestone B 
decision) with the ability to determine if the system meets performance criteria 
and establishes the hardware and software systems to support continued 
development and production of the MDAP. This level of confidence comes with a 
technical maturity level commensurate with the successful completion of PDR 
assessment. It should be recognized, however, that this requirement may result 
in delayed progression through Milestone B, as successful implementation of the 
PDR may delay the entire acquisition effort.  Regardless, implementation of this 
requirement should be rigorously pursued, as a successful PDR gives the MDA 
the ability to recommend requirement tradeoffs based upon an assessment of 
acceptable cost, schedule, and performance risk.  
F. CRITICAL COST GROWTH IN MDAPS 
Past acquisition policy that allowed for minimal reporting and inadequate 
cost growth thresholds resulted in substantial overruns prior to alerting oversight 




the PM control cost related to the design or technology issues facing the 
program, or risk program cancellation and an intense level of scrutiny, 
accompanied by corrective action reporting. 
Recommendations related to this issue of critical cost growth include 
maintaining Congressional involvement and oversight as prescribed by WSARA. 
PM/PEOs must establish policies for root cause analysis of failure, and 
development of PEO/agency-wide reporting process to streamline reporting for 
Nunn-McCurdy requirements would alleviate increased costs associated with the 
new law. Additionally, PEOs should be cognizant of the possible need for 
increased personnel and schedule impacts due to increased scrutiny and 
reporting. 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MDAPS 
Policies in place prior to WSARA did not provide details regarding the 
implementation of blocking potential conflicts of interest (COI). Without adequate 
regulation, the perception of COI, if not actual improprieties, was likely to impact 
the acquisition decisions made by MDAPs. 
WSARA increases government acquisition office confidence that 
information received from the contractors is the best information that industry can 
offer. It may be concluded that the Congress intended for the establishment of a 
governmental organization to police contractor integrity in circumstances where 
contractors are providing acquisition-sensitive services, and where those 
contractors might use their position to take advantage of their unique access to 
the Government’s acquisition strategies. The implementation of this law will 
require time to evaluate the success and suitability of the guidance. It is 
recommended that PEOs and acquisition offices establish formal policy regarding 
the surveillance and monitoring of contractor proposals and services rendered, 
with the specific purpose of preventing actual or perceived conflict of interest. 
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